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domestic product (GDP) today. For proponents, TiSA 
is a promising step toward accumulating greater 
wealth. For detractors, TiSA is a clear threat to 
democracy and the public interest of the world’ s 
citizens. The stakes are high. Yet, only high-level 
government officials from 50 governments 
( ‘Parties’ ), 1  including countries as small as Costa 
Rica and as large as the US, are at the negotiating 
table. Global corporations have privileged 
‘behind-the-scenes’ access, while civil society does 
By now, if you are reading this you may well have 
already read something on the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA), and perhaps something on its 
other global counterparts, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). TiSA is the most 
recent, and far-reaching, attempt by governments and 
global elites to set a new standard in trade relations. 
Why? Services (from accounting to call centres) 
represent roughly 70 per cent of the total global gross 
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TiSA and
the Threat
to Public Banks
Why we must stop this global financial Inferno
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
By now, if you are reading this you may well have 
already read something on the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA), and perhaps something on its 
other global counterparts, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). TiSA is the most 
recent, and far-reaching, attempt by governments and 
global elites to set a new standard in trade relations. 
Why? Services (from accounting to call centres) 
represent roughly 70 per cent of the total global gross 
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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not. Big business stands to gain a lot. But most 
ordinary people simply stand to lose. This is 
especially so in the often technical and seemingly 
inaccessible area of financial services.
Financial services form a major part of TiSA, 
encompassing all insurance, insurance-related 
activities and banking, as well as any other financial 
services – essentially, the totality of finance, 
domestically and globally. The outcome of TiSA will 
inevitably touch on the daily lives of billions of 
people, and millions of families.
At face value, the TiSA Financial Services Annex X, 
first leaked in June 2014, proposes to treat financial 
services as if they were just like any other TiSA 
service. 2  And, in TiSA’ s neoliberal worldview, all 
services should be subject to market-based 
competition for profit – as the ultimate guarantor of 
efficiency.
But the financial institutions offering these services 
are not all the same. Take banks, for example, which 
have long been of both public (or state-owned) and 
private origin. Private banks typically operate, first 
and foremost, in accordance with profit mandates. 
This is not necessarily so for public banks, whose first 
priorities have typically included a wide range of 
developmental, public, and social goods that are not 
reducible to profit maximisation. 
Moreover, financial services, which are often but not 
only provided by public and private banks, are 
different because they are systematically important. 
Unlike accounting or call centres, financial services 
are central to the overall functioning of society, 
nationally and internationally. Subjecting all things 
financial, willy-nilly, to the solitary vagaries of 
profit-maximising competition is not just 
short-sighted, it is dangerous and leads to recurrent 
and extremely costly financial crises. This also raises 
the spectre of financialisation.
In its current form, TiSA will amplify the structural 
power of financialisation, reflecting the mounting 
importance of financial motives and credit in our 
everyday lives, and its class-based implication. Over 
the last 30 years, the interests of financial capital in 
accumulating ever-increasing mountains of wealth 
have become increasingly fused into the state 
apparatus, forming a new social and institutional 
logic. Now, state managers and government elites are 
under great pressure to accept the interests of finance 
as in their own country’ s interests. This has 
translated into the financial priorities that now guide 
official domestic policy (like Central Bank 
independence and inflation targeting) and, by 
extension, international rules and regulations. TiSA is 
an attempt to institutionalise financialised imperatives 
globally. 
TiSA needs to be challenged and, to be sure, our 
intervention is not the first. To date, some of the most 
prominent critiques of TiSA and its treatment of 
financial services include the following 3  :
1. More financialisation: TiSA is committed to 
buttressing the same casino-like financial architecture 
and accumulation imperatives that caused the costly 
global credit-fuelled financial bubbles and crises since 
2008-2009.
2. Locked-in neoliberal privatisation: In addition 
to the general thrust of private market forces, specific 
mechanisms in TiSA, like the “standstill” and 
“ratchet” clauses, will screw governments, now and in 
the future, to now-dominant neoliberal strategies of 
development, making it difficult to reverse 
privatisation, ‘re-publicise’ services, or to restrict 
access of foreign capital to domestic markets.
3. Undermining democracy, ignoring history: 
Many of TiSA’ s articles are explicitly intended to tie 
the hands of governments to an idealised free market 
form of capitalism, which is most beneficial to the 
rich and wealthy. But this ignores the historical role 
that states and democracy have played in planning 
development in all societies, even in the US and 
European countries.
These are significant problems, and worth acting 
upon. But more work needs to be done. Notably, we 
are concerned with the threat that TiSA poses to the 
potential of public banks to do financial services 
better, and in the public interest.
within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Banco Popular, Costa Rica – Banco Popular is a special-charter bank, owned by its Costa Rican workers. 
Credit: Luis Tamayo, Flickr
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
TiSA and the Threat to Public Banks4
within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
European Day of Action in Dublin – On September 29, 2010, a Europe-wide action day against austerity 
measures, a protester is holding up a sign that says: “Bail-out services not banks. Credit: William Murphy, 
Flickr
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
Manifestation for a united Belgium – On January 23, 2011,  at the march for the country's unity, a protester 
is holding up a sign that says: “Save the solidarity between all workers.” Credit: Tijl Vercaemer, Flickr
What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
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within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
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What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
Do public banks still exist?
Yes.
It remains true that not all banks, past or present, are 
privately owned corporate banks like Citibank or 
HSBC. In fact, roughly 25 per cent of all banks are 
majority public or state-owned banks, according to 
2012 World Bank data. 4   This includes some of the 
world’ s largest public banks, such as the China 
Construction Bank, the Brazilian BNDES, and the 
State Bank of India. It also includes some of the 
world’ s smaller public banks, such as the National 
Bank of Costa Rica, the East African Development 
Bank,  and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy.
What do public banks do?
Plenty.
Like any private bank, public banks can offer a range 
of banking, credit, saving, mortgage, investment, 
development finance, insurance, and payment 
services. Such services will depend on whether the 
bank is a public commercial or development bank and 
on its scale of operations (sub-national; national; 
regional). What any given public bank does depends 
on its specific mandate: Turkey’ s Ziraat Bank 
supports farmers; Fiji’ s Development Bank funds 
both small projects and national infrastructure; the 
German Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB) aids state-level 
public programming; and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) has an exclusively social 
mandate. That is, there is a world of public banks 
operating under a rainbow of mandates, missions, and 
scales – from funding farmers and SMEs, to 
promoting social inclusion and equity, to supporting 
regional development, to enabling government 
development priorities. 5
The world of public banking is by no means flawless. 
Public banks have been guilty of corruption; of 
sparking economic crises; and of being unsustainable. 
Could one say anything different of private banks? 
Certainly not. All banks, be they public or private, 
have problems. Yet public banks are uniquely able, 
and willing, to directly respond to public mandates; to 
focus on the long term; to promote the public good; 
and to support communities at times of crisis. 
Moreover, there remain real and realisable avenues of 
democratic representation and accountability that are 
non-existent or simply impossible to implement 
within the corporate private banking sector. 
Furthermore, public banks may be the only financial 
institutions able to counteract the deepening and 
destructive financialisation of our societies. 6 
TiSA thus represents an attack on the potential public 
good of public banks. In response, we see four pillars 
around which resistance can and should be organised. 
I. Defending the public good: Are public 
banks at risk?
Yes.
TiSA is an attack on the future publicness of public 
banking around the world. Despite 30 years of 
privatisation, publicly owned banks remain active in 
most countries and communities. Yet the importance 
of TiSA to the future of public banks has yet to be 
raised as a fulcrum of resistance. This lack of attention 
is curious, and alarming, and shows how the secrecy 
of negotiations has not allowed the public to be 
meaningfully informed or engaged. 
We urgently need to turn the debate on TiSA to its 
negative impact on public banking, placing the 
defence of public banks at the heart of the global 
movement against TiSA.
Indeed, by privileging a private, profit-oriented vision 
of financial services over the public good and public 
provisioning, TiSA will impact public banks’ 
mandates and capacities to serve the public interest, 
directly and indirectly, now and in the future. In this 
way, public banks will be pressured to internalise the 
interests of a global, private, corporate elite by forcing 
their activities into increasingly narrow competitive 
market logics – this being a precursor to eventual 
bank privatisation. Again, we do not claim that public 
banks are perfect, but they do a lot of good. And today 
many civil society organisations are doing important 
work to improve and make them more accountable. 
TiSA will only undermine public banks’ potential. In 
short, public banks continue to offer viable, desirable, 
and defendable alternatives to neoliberalism and 
financialisation, and they are an alternative that needs 
protecting from TiSA in the public good.
II. Intensifying profit-maximising 
competition: Can TiSA force public 
banks to operate according to private 
interests?
Yes.
The secret TiSA advocates do not want to hide is that 
the proposed agreement is fundamentally about 
deepening and extending the role of competition and 
markets in global service provisioning. What is less 
transparent is that this entails the intensification of 
profit-maximising competition among already 
hyper-competitive financial forces. While public 
banks have been increasingly exposed to and affected 
by such competition since the post-1980s emergence 
of neoliberalism, different states have retained tools 
capable of shielding their public banks for the public 
good. TiSA advocates seek to tear down any such 
shields, and expose public banks more directly and 
intensely to market processes defined in the ‘private’ 
interest, that is, profit-maximisation. Therein, a 
number of specific TiSA articles are worth 
highlighting.
Making the wolf at home
Among the more significant measures proposed, 
Article X.9 on New Financial Services will mean that 
national governments will have to allow already 
established foreign financial services “to supply any 
new financial service” permissible to its own financial 
service suppliers. Governments may have some 
recourse to national authorisation, but decisions must 
“be made within a reasonable time” and national 
authorisation can be “refused only for prudential 
reasons” (i.e. regulatory reasons). This will 
significantly increase the opportunities for foreign 
financial services to dominate other countries’ 
domestic markets. There is substantial evidence, 
moreover, of foreign commercial banks targeting only 
the most lucrative clients (also known as skimming 
the cream). This leaves the riskier and costlier clients 
for either domestic players or public banks. TiSA will 
enable practices like foreign ‘skimming’ , which can 
undermine the financial sustainability of public banks 
putting them at risk simply to maximise private 
financial gains.
Article X.14 on Non-discriminatory Measures (from 
the 25 September 2015 version) took a shotgun 
approach, stipulating that any and all domestic 
non-discriminatory measures, whether intended or 
not, must not adversely affect any other financial 
service suppliers’ capacity “to operate, compete or 
enter the Party’ s market.” Foreign financial service 
suppliers could see public banks as an obstacle to their 
operations. Fortunately, Article X.14 has subsequently 
been dropped, but observers must be vigilant against 
any resurfacing as the measure aims to make public, 
government prerogatives effectively private in 
orientation. The problem is that some TiSA countries 
have already agreed to it in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Not only is the wolf at 
home, TiSA invites it to tea.
Making external rules internal ones
Earlier drafts of TiSA’ s Financial Services Annex 
Article X.15 on Transparency (see 25 September 2015 
and 27 June 2016 versions) take the 
institutionalisation of private financial logics further. 
While widely understood as an important principle of 
democratic accountability, the transparency of 
financial services is radically reduced to a matter of 
“facilitating access” of private actors to public 
regulation, almost without constraint. Transparency is 
thus rendered a derivative of ‘doing business’ , not 
democracy. For example, the 25 September 2015 
version of TiSA required that governments publish in 
advance any regulatory measures of any general 
application to the Financial Services Annex to allow 
for comment by other Parties. This private financial 
sector Trojan Horse has subsequently been dropped, 
but should it rear its head once more it will subvert 
domestic democratic deliberation by forcing 
governments to provide non-citizens – who are in 
reality most often corporate and/or foreign lobbyists – 
privileged access to domestic regulation-making. The 
latest leak surfacing in January 2017 removed the 
most aggressive measures, but Article X.15 still seeks 
to institutionalise a process by which external private 
corporate demands become internalised within the 
public sphere, in one way or another.
Article X.15 goes further by advocating that 
“internationally recognised standards” (January 2017 
version) on financial regulation and supervision, often 
set by a cabal of undemocratic international 
organisations, be applied domestically. The 25 
September 2015 version was explicit on this account. 
The G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Financial Action Task Force, and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) should be the global standard 
setters. Yet such international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and organisations are well-resourced, 
pro-market actors whose actions and expertise are 
often shaped by the interests of the global North and 
powerful financial actors. Moreover, the G20, FSB 
and OECD are regular promoters of privatisation and 
private finance as the key drivers of development. If 
and when the full privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and public banks may not be 
possible, these players inevitably recommend 
marketisation – that is, making public bodies act as if 
they were private, profit-seeking actors. 
‘Transparency’ , as conceived of in the Financial 
Services Annex, will undermine governments’ 
capacity to choose how they would like to run and 
regulate their own public banks. 
One area where TiSA legitimises domestic 
decision-making autonomy can be found in Article 
X.16 on Prudential Measures. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the agreement, TiSA suggests that 
governments must not be prevented from adopting or 
maintaining measures for “prudential reasons.” The 
definition of ‘prudential reasons’ remains contested, 
yet current wording reflects conventional 
understandings related to the maintenance and 
safeguarding of stability, soundness, and safety for 
individual financial providers and the financial 
system. Article X.16 also makes clear that prudential 
reasons must not be used as a smokescreen to avoid 
meeting any other TiSA commitments. So, to the 
extent that governments can choose, they have to 
make choices that will protect the viability of an 
increasingly hyper-financialised system. Omitted, by 
no mistake, is any recognition that prudential 
measures might well involve governments owning and 
controlling financial institutions that are mandated to 
work in the public interest to safeguard the stable 
reproduction and development of society.
Making public banks act like private ones
The financial implications of TiSA vis-à-vis public 
banks need also be read alongside the TiSA Annex on 
State-Owned Enterprises, whose scope (Article X.2) 
includes any SOE implicated in trade in services 
(excluding, however, central banks, regulatory 
agencies, sovereign wealth funds, and some pension 
funds). 7 Incredibly, TiSA’ s SOE Article X.3 on 
Administrative Bodies demands that governments 
ensure that any administrative body dealing with a 
state-owned or public enterprise, like banks, must 
exercise “its regulatory discretion in an impartial 
manner” as compared to all other enterprises. This is 
far from impartial, insofar as the standard being set is 
that of the private sector’ s interest, not the public 
sector’ s. Moreover, this denudes governance of its 
substance, rendering it legitimate and consequential 
only insofar as it supports private accumulation on 
market-based competitive terms. It is also ahistorical 
and blind. Ahistorical insofar as it ignores the history 
of development, industrial planning, and the role of 
the state in all cases of development. Blind, insofar as 
it negates any future role for governments and 
parliaments in taking an active hand in addressing 
society’ s grand challenges, like inequality and 
climate change. In short, the history of development 
has been about partiality and planning, and in no small 
measure public services and public banks have been at 
the forefront.
That is not all. The TiSA SOE Article X.4 on 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment and Commercial 
Considerations is the potential nail in the coffin of 
existing, and future, public services like banking. This 
remarkable article aims at forcing governments to 
ensure that all SOEs act in accordance with 
“commercial considerations” in the purchase, supply, 
or sale of goods and services. It is worth specifying 
the TiSA understanding of “commercial.” SOE 
Article X.1 specifies “commercial activities” as those 
services undertaken with an orientation toward 
profit-making and “commercial considerations” as 
entailing “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, and other terms and conditions of 
purchase or sale” or any other factors that would 
“normally be taken into account” by private actors. 
Should governments ever consider making any 
exceptions for any public service, versions of TiSA 
demand such preferential terms be consistent with 
TiSA and accorded to all TiSA Parties, effectively 
negating the purpose of preferential treatment for 
public services. Leaked EU comments dated October 
2016 suggest softened wording around respecting 
public service mandates, but these have yet to be 
incorporated.
Making it last…
TiSA advocates want to lock-in TiSA rules, forever. 
TiSA SOE Article X.7 on Future Negotiations (6 
October 2015 version; Article X.8 in leaked EU 
comments version dated October 2016) is of particular 
significance to public banks. If a SOE, like a bank, 
plays a dominant role in a signatory or future 
signatory country’ s economy, which in many 
countries public banks do, this article can force these 
countries into binding negotiations to limit or 
discipline any “non-commercial assistance to 
state-owned enterprises” so that it “does not cause 
adverse effects to another Party’ s interests.” This is a 
vague, and powerful, statement that will undermine 
current and future government capacity to provide 
preferential treatment for any reason other than 
commercial. For instance, preferential loans from 
public banks to ‘green’ (retrofit) public buildings like 
schools and universities could be undermined; grants 
to support employment, eliminated; credits to develop 
new technologies, scrapped. Indeed, quite 
conceivably, another party’ s interests might involve 
their heavy investments in coal-powered energy 
provisioning: that means public bank support for 
public alternative energy could be challenged if this is 
not done on purely commercial, for-profit grounds. If 
this is the future of global services, we have much to 
fear.
III. Enabling the socialisation of private 
financial risks: Will public banks be left 
holding the financialisation bag?
Yes.
Having set out to intensify profit-maximising 
competition in financial services as its base principle, 
TiSA by no means intends to truly abandon private 
corporations to the discipline of financial markets. 
The great financial powers want a backdoor escape 
mechanism for when things go wrong. And, TiSA 
provides one. The linchpin can be found in the SOE 
Article X.4 on Non-Discriminatory Treatment and 
Commercial Considerations. 
While on the one hand TiSA SOE Article X.4 aims to 
‘level the playing field’ (as discussed above), this 
article also states that non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations can be overlooked should 
governments need to respond to economic crisis, 
nationally or globally. That is, if the objective is to 
stabilise unstable markets, to support great financial 
powers in trouble, and to preserve global capitalism, 
then governments are free to mobilise public 
institutions as they wish. That is, TiSA legitimises 
governments socialising the risks of competitive 
risk-taking by drawing them into the state apparatus 
and its own public enterprises. As the leaked 2015 
version of SOE Article X.4(3) states:
 Nothing in this Article shall be construed to:  
 (a) prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing  
 measures to respond temporarily to a national  
 or global economic emergency; or (b) apply  
 to state-owned enterprise for which a Party  
 has taken measures on a temporary basis in  
 response to a national or global economic  
 emergency.
Notably, no official negotiating party has signalled 
any disagreement with this Article, and the essence of 
this measure is retained in full in the leaked October 
2016 version.
The intent of TiSA SOE Article X.4 reflects the post 
2008-2009 global crisis management strategy 
advocated by the World Bank.  8  As the number of 
financial crises have skyrocketed with financial 
deregulation since the 1980s – notably the 1994 
Turkish and Mexican, 1997 East Asian, 1998 
Brazilian and Russian, and 2001 Turkish crises – the 
major IFIs have by no means sought to eliminate 
financial risks but instead continue to celebrate private 
financial risk. IFIs do this while accepting that public 
authorities will inevitably have to socialise the costs 
as and when financial risks go really bad. To the 
extent market advocates suffer the continued existence 
of public banks, then, this is often so that they can 
help absorb the impacts of economic instability in a 
neoliberal financialised world and help ensure 
continuity in a strategy of development geared to 
private accumulation. Indeed, public banks’ 
‘counter-cyclical’ lending capacity is the one, 
begrudgingly accepted, role for public banks noted in 
the World Bank’ s Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, titled “Rethinking the Role of the State 
in Finance.”  9  Whereas private banks are 
‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e. they reduce lending at times of 
crisis thereby worsening the downturn), public banks 
can help ‘counter’ crises by lending more at times of 
distress.
We are by no means the first to use this phrase, but 
TiSA makes it all the more relevant as the agreement 
represents a global expression of the maxim ‘the 
privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss’ .
IV. Undermining the democratic, public 
good: Will public banks’ role in 
confronting society’ s grand challenges 
be fatally impacted, now and in the 
future?
Yes.
The TiSA Financial Services Article X.19 on Dispute 
Settlement represents the zenith of its anti-democratic 
trajectory, certain to undermine democracy. The TiSA 
version of dispute settlement is not the same as the 
existing investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
system found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP or as included in TTIP 
negotiations. The ISDS enables foreign companies to 
directly sue sovereign states for perceived breaches of 
investment protection rules such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment. While TiSA differs, the approach 
is not all that distinct. TiSA dispute settlement 
mechanism entails a state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism outside of national courts and without real 
judges, which will make judgements based on TiSA 
articles, as is the case in GATS. Specifically, “for 
disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters,” an expert panel will be created to have the 
necessary expertise relevant to the specific financial 
service under dispute. This panel will be vested with 
the authority to determine whether or not domestic 
decisions on financial regulation and financial 
services are consistent with TiSA. If deemed 
prejudicial to TiSA rules and as affecting the financial 
services of other parties, then the complainant “may 
suspend benefits in the financial services sector that 
have an effect equivalent to the effect of the measure 
in the Party's financial services sector.” This gives an 
unelected and unaccountable panel the power to not 
only condemn domestic regulation and measures, but 
in doing so exact sanctions and punitive power that 
affects all TiSA members. The two most recent leaks, 
moreover, now suggest that changes may be needed to 
adapt this Article vis-à-vis the TiSA Dispute 
Settlement Annex. This is one area to keep a keen eye 
on.
The reason to be of TiSA is to draw all Parties’ traded 
services as close as possible to a competitive, 
commercial, for-profit orientation. But this is a private 
imperative, not a public one. Nevertheless, TiSA must 
confront quite different political and economic 
realities among negotiating Parties. So, the October 
2016 SOE Annex inserted a new statement in Article 
X.2 specifying that “nothing in this Annex shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from establishing or 
maintaining a state-owned enterprise” while SOE 
Article X.5 maintains a provision for Parties to list 
existing SOE “non-conforming activities” as 
exemptions in negotiations. These most recent 
concessions to public sector services is welcome, yet 
the hard-core market and profit orientation of TiSA 
continues to constitute real threats to the alternative 
ethos and practices of public delivery of services, 
including banks. It is pure ideology and private 
self-interest that suggests all public banks should act 
like private ones. 
As but one example of the narrow-mindedness of 
TiSA, it is a rare social justice activist or 
environmental organisation that believes private 
finance or market-based solutions on their own are 
anywhere near capable of, or willing to, catalyse a 
global energy transition to a low-carbon future. TiSA 
fetishises and institutionally fixes the neoliberal 
mythology of market solutions for all problems. But 
all serious commentators and experts on climate 
change financing accept the need for substantive, 
long-term, and planned interventions by national 
public banks to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
future – a point highlighted in the United Nations’ 
2015 Financing for Development Report.
Looking forward: What can be done to 
stop TiSA and support good public 
banks?
Once you peel away the technical jargon and official 
posturing, TiSA represents a process driven by great 
financial powers to further their own great financial 
interests. No article, no line of TiSA represents a 
democratic advancement or falls within the public 
interest. The US and EU lead negotiations, backed by 
powerful financial lobby groups actively militating for 
a strong TiSA that favours strong market-based, 
private sector solutions. They shroud their narrow 
interests in an underlying ideological rationale that 
presumes private actors and markets can best resolve 
all social, political, economic, developmental, and 
ideological problems – that is, neoliberalism. This 
class-based approach vigorously protects itself from 
having to consider contending ‘public interest’ , 
popular democratic, and working class perspectives 
and alternatives.
The entrenchment of great financialised power in 
TiSA will undermine public banking alternatives and 
further the already bloated power of global private 
finance to the detriment of the public interest. 
Citizens, academics, policy-makers, workers, 
peasants, unions, and activists need to cooperatively 
resist TiSA.
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What can be done? Elsewhere, we developed some 
evidence-based ideas that could help guide popular 
strategies to defend national public banks. 10  While a 
full discussion of these strategies cannot be had here, 
the following points may help spark new ideas for 
organisation and resistance to TiSA alongside a 
broad-based defence of public banks:
1) Framing public finance as a common good:  
 The financial sector is the nervous system of  
 society, and it needs to be run in the public  
 interest.
2) Democratised banking: The struggle to defend  
 public banks must also involve their   
 democratisation as a long-term strategy of  
 social sustainability.
3) Collective ownership and control: State   
 ownership is only one form of control, and  
 many other progressive, collective forms of  
 cooperative and worker-controlled banks  
 should be pursued too and not be undermined  
 by TiSA rules.
4) Radical scholarship: Critical scholars must  
 engage more systematically in the real   
 problem of understanding and advocating for  
 effective public financial alternatives. Their  
 message should be conveyed to activists,  
 regulators, and TiSA negotiators.
5) Linking the green transition to public   
 provisioning: Environmental sustainability  
 demands effective, long-term, and   
 accountable sources of finance. Public banks  
 are uniquely capable of playing a lead,   
 proactive role in a global green and just   
 transition. 
6) Collective organisation in the banking sector:  
 Bank workers need effective union   
 representation, and unions can be powerful  
 actors of resistance to neoliberalism and  
 financialisation.
7) Solidarity across sectors: Too often dialogue  
 and solidarity between traditional trade   
 unionists, finance workers, and (other) public  
 sector workers is non-existent, and this needs  
 to change.
